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ABSTRACT 
This paper conducts a study of the relative effectiveness of the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) - the 
primary federal mortgage loan modification program - from early 2009 through 2016. It evaluates U.S. Treasury 
Department and other data sources, and reviews the recent literature on the relative success of the program. The 
analysis suggests that HAMP’s success rate in modifying mortgage loans was likely constrained by its voluntary design, 
a structure that enabled lenders and servicers to prioritize the interests of investors in assessing the risks of 
modification. It then considers the economic issues surrounding the foreclosure issue and presents a theoretical 
analysis, posing an alternative model illustrating where modification can be cost reducing. Concluding remarks reflect 
on the importance of promoting economic stability in policy design.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH OVERVIEW 
Despite indicators of emerging recovery in the U.S. housing market at the end of 2012, the problem of 
default and foreclosure remained a significant drag on economic recovery and job growth through 2012. 
This was particularly the case in many distressed housing markets nearly six years after the nation’s 
foreclosure crisis began following the unraveling of the subprime mortgage market and the housing market 
collapse. Numerous policies to stem the rapid growth in foreclosures were introduced and enacted at both 
federal and state levels starting in late 2008 and early 2009.  
This discussion is focused on a critical evaluation of the relative success rate of the federal Home 
Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) from March 2009 when the program took effect through 2016 
when the program was scheduled to wind down (excluding modifications still in progress; U.S. Treasury, 
Making Home Affordable Q42016). HAMP, whose stated goal is “to offer homeowners who are at risk of 
foreclosure reduced monthly mortgage payments that are affordable and sustainable over the long-term,” 
has functioned as a voluntary program that relies upon loan servicers to modify the loans of struggling 
homeowners through lower monthly payments, thus lowering the risk of foreclosure (U.S. Treasury Dept. 
Making Home Affordable 2012).  
Despite HAMP’s status as the largest of the government mortgage modification programs, the program 
lead to trial {conditional} modifications for just over 2.5 million borrowers at risk of foreclosure by year-end 
2016, the overall success rate as measured by the number of permanent modifications relative to total trial 
modifications initiated appears to have fallen short of the program’s potential.  
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The central argument made here is that the design of the program, which established rather strict 
criteria for borrowers to be considered for a modification, and relied on the voluntary participation of 
lenders/servicers, essentially ensured that many borrowers in need of loan modifications would simply not 
qualify, limiting participation from the outset. In the years immediately following the banking and financial 
crisis, lending overall slowed significantly, and servicer resistance to participation in mortgage modification 
efforts was evident in the comparatively small number of actual loans modified. Despite one of the key 
requirements established under the Temporary Asset Relief Program – that banks’ receiving temporary 
assistance - must consider homeowners for a loan modification, there remained no mandatory requirement 
that lenders actually modify the loans of homeowners at risk of default and foreclosure. This essentially 
enabled servicers for the most part to decide which borrowers they would work with, typically those viewed 
as posing the lowest risk of re-default. Even with the modest servicer incentives introduced later in the 
program, total permanent modifications as a share of all trial modifications initiated was 38.3 percent 
nationally as of year-end 2016.  
An overview of the structure of the Home Affordable Modification Program, not only provides a 
framework within which to understand the numerous obstacles facing homeowners seeking modifications, 
but also reveals the underlying rationale of lenders/servicers in the context of these obstacles.   
 In early 2009, in an effort to reach growing numbers of troubled borrowers, new foreclosure prevention 
measures were introduced, including the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), the Home 
Affordable Refinance Program (HARP), and 2MP, a program that offered either modification of or 
extinguishment of second liens for homeowners who had already refinanced their primary loan under 
HAMP. In February 2009, the U.S. Treasury Department allocated $50 million in TARP funds to help 
homeowners struggling with their mortgages. 
HAMP and HARP were created as part of the Homeowner Affordability and Stability Plan in an effort to 
help struggling homeowners avoid foreclosure either by modifying or refinancing their first mortgages.  
Unlike earlier initiatives such as Help for Homeowners (H4H)1 that relied entirely upon the voluntary 
participation of lenders and servicers, HAMP required all banks and lending institutions that received 
government assistance under the Troubled Asset Relief Program to initiate loan modifications for loans that 
were eligible under HAMP guidelines (Robinson, 2009). However, while this mandate did not apply to non-
TARP banks, it was short-lived. In April of 2009, the Treasury Department stipulated that Help for 
Homeowners (H4H) should be the primary source for homeowners seeking a modification before applying 
under HAMP (Robinson, 2009). In essence, the TARP mandate to lender participation was further 
weakened and the process became more bureaucratic for homeowners. In October 2011, the Federal 
Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac improved upon HARP-eligible mortgages 
by making refinancing possible for borrowers who owed more on their mortgages than their homes were 
worth (Fannie Mae, 2012).  
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A further change made to the original HAMP program by the Treasury Department was a second lien 
modification program, known as 2MP. Participation in 2MP would be limited to borrowers who obtained a 
second lien on or before January 1, 2009 and who had already attained a first lien modification under 
HAMP. Under 2MP, a second lien that met these requirements would be eligible for either modification or 
extinguishment (Robinson, 2009). However, 2MP appeared to have had limited success in attracting lender 
participation, with an estimated 163,000 second lien modifications from the program’s inception through 
December 2016 (U.S. Treasury Dept., December 2016). The principal obstacle was that a second lien 
modification was not possible unless the borrower had first obtained a first lien modification. The significant 
numbers of homeowners in negative equity and the continued decline in home values posed a major 
obstacle to gaining access to the second lien modification program. This issue is inextricably connected to 
the problem of voluntary lender/servicer participation.  
Further, HAMP’s own guidelines, established a number of requirements stipulating which borrowers 
could qualify for a HAMP modification. From the program’s beginnings in March 2009, borrowers with 
conventional loans would qualify if they were delinquent 60 or more days on their mortgages. This 
essentially disqualified hundreds of thousands of borrowers (if not more), particularly those who held 
subprime loans and were not yet delinquent. These borrowers were among the first to feel the impact of 
the housing market collapse, and unaffordable mortgages as a result of spiraling interest rates that were 
built into their initial loan terms. At the same time, conventional loan holders who may have suffered a 
recent job or income loss, but otherwise had been in good standing on their loan payments were required 
to be in delinquency to even begin the process of qualifying for a modification that might either reduce their 
principal balance or their interest rate.  
Only in late January 2012 did the Treasury Department announce changes that expanded eligibility to 
borrowers with non-Government Sponsored Enterprise (GSE) loans (a move that benefited many subprime 
loan holders), established more flexible debt-income criteria, and allowed non-owner-occupied properties 
(i.e. those being rented or vacant properties which were being offered for rent) to qualify for a HAMP loan 
modification. These changes went into effect on June 1, 2012 (U.S. Treasury, 2012).       
Nevertheless, it is argued here that the voluntary feature of the government mortgage loan modification 
programs, and of HAMP in particular, coupled with the somewhat stringent requirements for borrowers to 
even qualify for a HAMP trial modification during the first four years of the program, was a significant barrier 
to the achievement of a higher permanent modification success rate and ultimately reduced its impact on 
the nation’s rising foreclosure rate.  
This voluntary feature, which is closely tied to the workings of mortgage markets in which investor 
interests are prioritized, largely limited the program’s success rate. There is strong evidence in the literature 
that this priority took the form of weighing the financial costs of foreclosure versus modification. The findings 
suggest that foreclosure often resulted not in a reduction of losses but rather increased losses for investors. 
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Thus, the HAMP program essentially deferred to the principal objectives of lenders and servicers to 
consider the long-term outcomes for investors of any modification activities.   
To obtain further insight into the factors that may have accounted for the program’s diminished impact, 
this inquiry begins with an examination of several variables that have been frequently cited in the literature 
as constraints on the ability of borrowers to qualify for a loan modification. These challenges include the 
large number of homes with negative equity, the high-risk nature of many loans, particularly in the subprime 
market, the type of loan modification received, and the complications posed by the initial requirement that 
a first lien modification is conditional on the ability to obtain a second lien modification. In many cases, the 
lender/servicer of the second lien was different from the servicer of the first lien, which complicated the 
modification process. These challenges are then considered in the light of the literature on the character of 
mortgage markets which accorded priority to reducing investor losses and which ultimately shaped the 
decisions of lenders and servicers to refrain from engaging in larger scale modification efforts.  
Within the context of a voluntary modification program, the kind of analysis and policy that informed 
actions taken by lenders in the interest of investors on failing mortgages appears to have clearly resulted 
in a significantly higher than socially optimal rate of foreclosure. It is apparent that both foreclosure and 
modification are costly. However, there are clearly differing circumstances in which modification would be 
the less costly course of action and where foreclosure is cost saving. Is there, from an economic cost-
benefit perspective, a rate of foreclosure that is acceptable from the perspective of lenders and investors – 
where the costs of foreclosure are essentially equal to the costs of preventing them through a loan 
modification? Under a policy requiring lenders/servicers to evaluate applicants for modification, HAMP 
could have realized a higher rate of success if such parameters had been in place. Thus, this study  poses 
a theoretical model that offers an alternative methodology for assessing the profitability of foreclosure 
versus modification based upon a framework for more systematically determining where modification can 
be cost saving for the investor as an alternative to foreclosure. At the same time, the theory considers the 
particular social and economic circumstances in which modification offers greater benefits for the borrower, 
the community and the economy overall.   
 
2. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE: OBSTACLES TO LOAN MODIFICATION   
A number of factors have been widely identified in the literature that would appear to pose challenges 
to the success of loan modification programs.  The assessment in much of the literature is that the forces 
that led to the foreclosure crisis continued to pose barriers to successful loan modification. These factors 
include the pervasive practice of low doc and no doc loans along with poor underwriting standards and 
deteriorating loan quality, particularly in the subprime market (Been, et al., 2011; LaCour-Little, et al., 2009); 
the large numbers of mortgages with second liens (Been, et al, 2011; LaCour-Little, et al., 2009); smaller 
down payments and a run-up in borrowing against home equity while home prices were still rising, coupled 
with declines in home price appreciation that began well before the crisis unfolded (Gerardi, et al, 2011).  
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This literature considers these dynamics, along with rising and persistent high unemployment in the wake 
of the crisis, the worsening negative equity position of a growing number of borrowers, and stagnant and/or 
continued weak recovery in home values as posing significant challenges to attaining higher rates of 
successful modification.  
LaCour-Little, et al (2013), studying a sample of 218,000 ALT-A and subprime home loans originated 
between 2000 and 2007 and securitized by Bear Stearns, found that the share with full documentation 
declined quite significantly from 42.4 percent to 21.6 percent over this period, while the share with low 
documentation increased from 11.5 percent to 69.3 percent. The loans, close to three-quarters of which 
were ARMs, were found to be associated with a significantly high default risk (2013).  
The large number of mortgages with second liens is identified as posing one of the greatest 
impediments to refinancing (Been, et. al., 2011; LaCour-Little, et. Al. 2009). It is estimated that between 40 
and 45 percent of new mortgage loans originated at the height of the housing boom (2005-2007) included 
a second lien or piggyback mortgage which enabled borrowers with less than a 20 percent down payment 
to purchase a home, particularly in high cost coastal markets and in markets where house prices 
accelerated comparatively rapidly (Haughwout, et. al., 2012). This same research also documents that both 
the number of and value of closed end second liens as opposed to home equity lines of credit (HELOCs) 
constituted a relatively small percentage of originations in 1999 compared with their peak in 2006. 
A broad cross-section of the literature is largely consistent in pinpointing the crisis in the subprime 
mortgage market beginning in 2006 as the catalyst for much of the larger housing market collapse that 
followed (Gerardi, and Willen, 2008; Gerardi, et al., 2011; Been, et al., 2011; Rugh and Massey, 2010; 
Bromley, et al., 2008).  
In the years immediately prior to the housing market collapse, increasing numbers of borrowers, 
particularly in the subprime market, were making very small down payments at the time of purchase, and 
in many cases, putting zero money down. At the same time, many borrowers who had purchased years 
before the onset of the crisis, had been withdrawing extraordinary amounts of equity while home prices 
were still rising, (Gerardi, et al, 2011).  This created heightened risk once home prices stalled and began 
their steep decline. These two conditions alone would clearly pose challenges to refinancing in a down 
market. After the market peaked, large numbers of homeowners – both subprime and prime - found 
themselves with negative equity.   
Other studies examining the mixed success rates of mortgage modification efforts focus on the 
persistent complications posed by second liens, negative equity, the failure of modifications to reduce 
principal balances, and the perception that modification poses a relatively greater cost to investors than 
foreclosure. Also considered are the shortcomings of the various government loan modification programs 
introduced in the wake of the foreclosure crisis.  
Been, et. al. (2011) point out that HAMP’s success was to a significant degree constrained by the 
presence of a second mortgage. “Second liens significantly complicate modifications because first lien 
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holders may lose their senior status upon modification,” and thus first lien holders are reluctant to agree to 
participate in a modification unless second lien holders agree to subordinate their liens to the newly modified 
mortgage (pg 382). As the authors point out, few have chosen to do so. Examining a sample of zip code-
level and state data, LaCour-Little, et al., (2009), found that the percentage of piggyback originations from 
2001 – 2008 was positively correlated with higher foreclosure rates in subsequent years. Their findings 
confirm that second liens rose rapidly during the housing boom and were a major contributing factor to 
underwater mortgages in the face of the sharp decline of home prices after the peak. They specifically 
looked at whether states and zip codes with a higher proportion of piggyback loans originated during the 
2001 - 2006 period experienced increased rates of delinquency and foreclosure. Their findings indicated 
that second lien originations to subprime borrowers were significantly related to higher rates of foreclosure 
after 2006. This outcome strongly suggests that borrowers with second liens were likely to be less 
successful in obtaining a loan modification. However, the findings did not especially hold for prime second-
lien borrowers (LaCour-Little, et al, 2009). Nevertheless, given the time of their study, it may have been too 
early to see the full effects of declining home equity coupled with a second lien, which affected large swaths 
of the home-owning population nationwide, as unemployment rose and home prices continued to decline 
throughout 2010 and 2011.   
The problem of rapidly deteriorating home equity as housing prices fell posed another hurdle to 
borrowers hoping to qualify for a loan modification. Not until the introduction of the Home Affordable 
Refinance Program’s ‘HARP 2.0’ in 2011, which allowed refinancing of up to 125 percent of a home’s 
original mortgage, was the problem of rising negative equity as a barrier to qualifying for a loan modification 
directly addressed (U.S. Treasury, 2011). 
Other inquiries, conducted relatively early in the course of the rapid rise in distressed properties, found 
strong evidence that principal balance reductions were associated with the strongest modification success 
rates for borrowers. The State Foreclosure Prevention Working Group(SFPWG)2 (Aug. 2010), analyzing a 
longitudinal dataset of nine loan servicers in New York State in 2007 before the crisis peaked, found that 
modifications that included significant reductions in the principal balance tended to have lower re-default 
rates than their counterparts. This finding led the group to recommend reducing principal balances on loans 
in areas experiencing significant home price declines. However, modifications with a significant reduction 
in principal balance represented just 20 percent of the loan modifications that the State Foreclosure 
Prevention Working Group (SFPWG, 2010) studied.  
Similarly, Querci and Ding (2009) found that borrowers were less likely to re-default on their home 
mortgage when their monthly payments were reduced through a balance-reducing loan modification. Using 
data from a large sample of recently modified subprime loans, the authors looked at the question of why 
some loan modifications were more likely to re-default than others. At the same time, they examined the 
characteristics of modifications that were more likely to re-default within a short-term period. Their findings 
confirmed that modifications that involved a significant reduction in mortgage payments tended to result in 
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more sustainable short-term modifications, and that re-default rates are further reduced when payment 
reductions also include a reduction in principal balances.3 Nevertheless, such modifications were often the 
exception as reflected in the 2010 SFPWG study.   
With the onset of the financial crisis in late 2008, the SFPWG concluded that a comprehensive 
approach to loan modification was necessary. At the time the organization issued its fourth report in January 
2010, it was estimated that just four out of ten seriously delinquent borrowers were on track for any kind of 
loan modification. The authors also concluded that while the HAMP program increased the percentage of 
borrowers participating in some form of loan modification, the rapidly rising number of such delinquent 
borrowers meant that HAMP had merely been able to slow the foreclosure crisis, and that its efforts have 
not been able to keep pace with the rising scale of delinquencies (SFPWG, Jan. 2010).  
However, despite the compelling evidence that HAMP was at best able to slow the pace of the 
foreclosure process by gradually qualifying more borrowers for modifications, and the findings of studies 
that principal balance reductions were clearly most successful in reducing re-default risk and benefitting 
borrowers, modifications continued to proceed at a relatively slow pace relative to the rising rates of default 
and foreclosure (SFPWG, 2010; Statistic Brain, 2016) and the share of such modifications that reduced 
principal balances remained comparatively small.    
The numerous obstacles to successful loan modification for countless borrowers in the aftermath of the 
housing crisis that these studies reveal appear to be linked to a key issue: that the voluntary design of the 
HAMP program, together with the primary goal of lenders/servicers to prioritize efforts to protect investors 
– a goal which itself shaped their voluntary participation – posed a significant barrier to a more robust 
success rate for HAMP. The voluntary structure of the HAMP program in essence deferred to the principal 
objective of lenders and servicers to consider the long-term outcomes for investors of any modification 
activities. This is highlighted in several studies that have placed the lower than potential rate of modification 
in perspective.    
Foote et. al., (2010); Adelino, et. al., (2009), White, (2009) and Piekorski (2011) focus on the central 
issue of potential losses to investors of re-default risk of modified loans in the face of rising job loss and 
home price depreciation. Foote et. al. (2010) find evidence that the unwillingness of many mortgage 
servicers to make large scale modifications is linked to the finding that the losses to investors from 
foreclosure are actually less than from modification, especially when modifications are done ‘en masse’ 
(2010). This would seem counterintuitive. However, the authors provide evidence that the added risk of 
borrowers re-defaulting on the modified loan enhances the potential losses to investors from modification 
vs. foreclosure. Thus, they conclude that foreclosure prevention policies aimed at reducing high debt-to-
income ratios and borrowers’ interest rates may not effectively reduce what they point to as the key source 
of loan defaults – falling home prices and job loss (pg. 91). In other words, perceived re-default risk may 
have much more to do with plummeting values of the asset – homes -combined with rapidly escalating 
unemployment across the economy, both of which pose a high re-default risk. From a net present value 
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perspective, they argue that most “potential modifications are negative-NPV transactions from the 
standpoint of investors” (120).   
Finally, there is the argument that some servicers were better equipped than others by virtue of their 
organizational capacity to process larger numbers of modifications than were others resulting in uneven 
outcomes across servicers (Agarwal et. al. (2012). Thus, the success rate of mortgage debt adjustment 
succeeded in assisting a significantly smaller percentage of households – approximately 30 percent based 
on the authors’ study - relative to the total who qualified (pg. 4). The authors examine the variance in lender 
participation in the context of NPV considerations (pg.24). They find that a number of modified loans re-
default following modification, while others that were initially delinquent emerge from delinquency without 
modification (i.e. they are self-cured). Overall, they find that a loan that is delinquent and which does not 
‘self-cure’ has a 50 to 60 percent probability of ending up in foreclosure (Argarwal et. al., 2012). 
What many of these studies share in common, including those that have analyzed mortgage loan data 
sets, (Adelino, et. al., 2009, Foote, et. al., 2010, LaCour-Little, 2009) is the conclusion that the securitization 
process in which mortgage loans are re-sold as investments, was not responsible for the low rate of 
modifications. Rather, the role of NPV calculations in deciding whether losses from foreclosure will be less 
than those from modification is central to the decision of a lender/servicer to participate in modifying a loan. 
The studies reach similar conclusions that confirm the centrality of loss mitigation concerns and therefore 
offer added insight into the problems associated with voluntary participation in HAMP.  
Thus, the many obvious obstacles to obtaining a loan modification discussed in the literature on 
negative equity, second liens, and loan modification type, can be understood in the larger context of the 
very risk that modification posed to investors and that lenders/servicers weighed in considering the extent 
of their participation in modification efforts. Investors were clearly aware of the growing risk posed by rising 
and stubbornly high unemployment coupled with the deteriorating value of their assets – homes -  and their 
central concern which was to protect the value of that asset. This perceived risk illuminates the pervasive 
uncertainty about the future direction of the economy that constrained broader participation in HAMP and 
provides a more far-reaching context within which to understand the program’s limited success.     
 
3. SUMMARY OF HAMP OUTCOMES  
An overview of key program outcomes between 2009 through 2011, as housing prices showed signs 
of reaching a bottom, offers some perspective on the overwhelming hurdles HAMP faced given its built-in 
constraints as well as the many challenges borrowers confronted in renegotiating their home mortgages. 
This may place into perspective the risks borrowers were considered to pose in the context of depressed 
home prices and worsening economic conditions. In 2011 IIQ, 22.1 percent of residential properties with a 
mortgage - an estimated 10.7 million homes – were still in negative equity nationwide, while more than two-
thirds of mortgage holders on such properties were paying above market interest rates (CoreLogic, 2011). 
This reflected only slight improvement from 2009 IIIQ when 24 percent of properties were in negative equity 
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(Warren, 2009; CoreLogic, Nov. 2009). That the negative equity rate remained essentially flat for two years 
following the official end of the recession in June 2009 reveals one of the challenges faced by HAMP as 
both modification applications and foreclosures also continued to rise.   
By year-end 2016, the percentage of mortgaged homes in negative equity declined significantly to 6.2 
percent. Interestingly, however, the overwhelming majority of homes with equity at year end 2016 – 96 
percent - were concentrated at the higher end of the market, where homes are valued at $200,000 and 
over (Core Logic, IVQ 2016).   
The negative equity problem was also reflected in home price declines during the crisis and in the years 
immediately following. The seasonally adjusted S&P Case-Shiller 20-city U.S. national home price index 
(quarterly) shows that the national market bottomed out in 2012 IQ after peaking in 2006 IIIQ. Over this 
period, U.S. home prices overall lost 36.9 percent of their value (S&P Case Shiller, 2017). By 2016 IVQ, 
home prices recovered 27 percent from their pre-recession peak.  
The unemployment rate, which peaked at 10.0 percent in October 2009, did not dip below 6 percent 
until September 2014 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics).  
Nationally, 962,209 homeowners out of 2,511,344 who entered into a first lien trial modification from 
HAMP’s inception in March 2009 through December 2016 completed a permanent modification of their 
home mortgage through the program. In total, 1,683,112 borrowers entered into a trial first lien permanent 
modification. (U.S. Department of the Treasury, QIV 2016). Among completed modifications, this represents 
a national success rate of 38.3 percent and 67 percent when cumulative trial modifications are included. 
200,552 permanent modifications featured a principal balance reduction through 2016, while 290,279 such 
modifications were in trial accounting for just 8.0 percent and 11.6 percent, respectively of all first lien trial 
modifications started.4 Under HAMP’s Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternative, borrowers denied a HAMP 
modification were required to be considered for a plan enabling them to exit their mortgage obligation 
through either a deed-in-lieu or a short sale. However, individual investors could impose further eligibility 
requirements (U.S. Department of the Treasury, QIV 2016) which could have made obtaining this option 
more of a challenge for some borrowers.  
Through December 2016, successful second lien modifications also represented a relatively small 
proportion of total modifications nationally. As of year-end 2016, 163,140 second liens had entered the 2MP 
modification program. Just 48,318 of these resulted in a full extinguishment of the second lien, while another 
10, 470 received a partial lien extinguishment. The remaining 79,343 second liens were in active 
modification status. Just five servicers accounted for 85 percent of second lien modifications through 
December 2016 (U.S. Treasury, 2016), representing a fraction of total servicers nationwide. 
A further comparison with national foreclosure data indicates an even smaller successful modification 
rate. More than 6.2 million foreclosures nationally were completed from 2009 through 2016 (Core Logic, 
March 2017). When compared to the 962,209 distressed mortgage holders who received a permanent loan 
modification, the percentage of successful modifications drops to 15.5 percent of troubled mortgages over 
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this seven-year period. The data on completed foreclosures appears to confirm that foreclosure was the 
overwhelming direction taken relative to modifications.  
The percent share of loan modifications among the top seven servicers through December 2016 reveals 
mixed outcomes. These ranged from a low of 2.7 percent for CitiMortgage, Inc. to a high of just 21 percent 
for Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, a subprime lender. Ocwen also accounted for the largest percentage of 
modifications featuring a principal balance reduction at nearly 49 percent of the total. These data also 
highlight the comparatively low percentage – 10.2 percent - that principal balance reductions made up of 
total modifications (U.S. Treasury, 2016). 
HAMP modifications among investor groups include all HAMP Tiers 1 and 2 and Streamline permanent 
modifications. The data suggest that loans held by the GSEs and by private investors had a larger 
proportion of permanent modifications compared to loans held in portfolio. The GSEs accounted for 39 
percent and private investors 44.1 percent of permanent modifications relative to just 16.9 percent for loans 
held in portfolio.    
 The comparatively small number of permanent modifications attained relative to foreclosures from 
the inception of the Home Affordable Modification Program in early 2009 through year-end 2016 should 
also be viewed from the perspective of the impact of foreclosures in an economy that experienced a 
prolonged and steep decline following the housing market collapse. Foreclosures accelerated rapidly from 
2007 through 2010, and while the policy response in the form of modification initiatives such as Help for 
Homeowners and HAMP helped to reduce the impact, the sizeable number of foreclosed properties in 
communities across the country had a direct impact on already declining property values in those markets. 
If a servicer or investor is more reluctant to modify a distressed underwater mortgage, the choice to 
foreclose instead simply exacerbates the problem and adds to a glut of vacated or abandoned properties, 
further dragging down the value of surrounding homes, increasing the economic costs. This affects all 
homeowners, not just those struggling to pay their mortgages and as the repercussions in the form of 
declining household wealth are experienced across the economy, the social and economic costs of 
foreclosure are magnified.   
The following discussion outlines a theoretical framework for understanding the economic issues and 
pressures that HAMP intended to address in the midst of a foreclosure crisis in which the economic interests 
of borrowers, servicers and investors were often at odds. The policy structure of the program ultimately 
resulted in a lower than optimal modification success rate. Given that foreclosures are both costly to prevent 
and to carry out, the discussion proposes a model for how the modification success rate could have been 
greater in the context of HAMP’s voluntary structure and how the problem of lenders who made risky 








Table 1: Making Home Affordable Program Activity by Servicer: March 2009 - December 2016 
Servicer HAMP Tier 1 
Permanent 
Modifications 





















103,134 8,004 N/A* 5,885 38,499 49,861 205,383 
CitiMortgage, 
Inc. 

















114,438 27,565 8,503 21,360 N/A* 22,374 194,240 
Wells Fargo 
Bank, N.A. 
199,734 12,368 0 30,432 25,032 44,639 312,205 
Other 
Servicers 
417,151 33,495 1,449 22,572 24,755 30,982 530,404 
Total 1,458,523 197,029 27,560 235,581 163,140 228,956 2,310,719 
Source: U.S. Treasury Department, December 2016 MHA Report. (It should be noted here that servicers report all trial 
modifications as permanent modifications). 
*Servicer does not participate in either Streamline HAMP or HAMP 2MP. 
11 Principal Reduction Alternative 
12 HAFA: Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternative (This program offered incentives to homeowners to terminate their mortgage  
commitment or to sell a rental property through a short sales or a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure). 
Notes from “Select HAMP Modification Characteristics” (p. 8, Making Home Affordable: HAMP Program Results: Program Performance  
Report Fourth Quarter 2016)  
**Under HAMP Tier 1, servicers apply the modification steps in sequence until the homeowner’s post-modification front-end  
debt-to-income (DTI) ratio is 31%. The impact of each modification step can vary to achieve the target of 31%. 
**Under HAMP Tier 2, servicers apply the modification steps simultaneously to achieve a post-modification DTI that falls within  
an allowable range (subject to investor restrictions). HAMP Tier 2 applies to non-GSE mortgages only. 
**Under Streamline HAMP, seriously delinquent homeowners who have not been able to complete a HAMP application may be  
eligible to receive mortgage assistance through a combination of modification steps similar to HAMP Tier 2. Unlike Tier 1 and  
Tier 2, Streamline HAMP does not require that borrowers document their income. 
      




Table 2: HAMP Permanent Modifications by Investor 
Servicer  All HAMP Permanent Modifications 
GSE  Private  Portfolio  Total  
Bank of America, N.A.  39,182  53,663  18,293  111,138  
CitiMortgage, Inc.  15,182  9,223  12,260  36,665  
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.  69,483  56,806  44,282  170,571  
Nationstar Mortgage LLC  119,528  82,379  8,935  210,842  
Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC  23,257  293,966  21,970  339,193  
Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc.  14,654  115,137  20,715  150,506  
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.  80,487  42,034  89,581  212,102  
Other Servicers  295,093  89,342  67,660  452,095  
Total  656,866  742,550  283,696  1,683,112  
 
 Source: U.S. Treasury Department, December 2016 MHA Report (all permanent modifications started are 
reported by servicers as permanent HAMP modifications). 
   
4. UNDERSTANDING THE ECONOMIC CONFLICTS: A THEORETICAL MODEL 
What were the economic issues at the heart of the conflicting interests of borrowers and 
lenders/servicers and investors? How did the tensions between these competing economic interests result 
in a less than optimal rate of successful loan modification and a higher rate of foreclosures? How did the 
structure of HAMP policy contribute to a less than optimal loan modification rate? How might outcomes 
have been different had policy been structured with the goal of bringing the economic interests of borrowers 
as well as servicers/investors into closer alignment?  
To place the economic issues in perspective, consider the developments that contributed to the crisis. 
Banks and other lenders, encouraged by an improving economy in the early 2000’s and an increased 
demand for homes made more mortgage loans to buyers. At the same time subprime lending, once a very 
small portion of the mortgage market grew to constitute 20 percent of all loans at the peak of the housing 
boom by 2005 from less than 5 percent in 1994 (Doms, et.al.,2007).  An expanding range of increasingly 
exotic mortgages enabled buyers – both prime and subprime – to purchase homes that they otherwise may 
not have been able to afford. Subprime loans which typically came with a higher rate of interest were 
particularly attractive to investors in mortgage backed securities as these offered a higher rate of return. 
The combination of exotic, risky and high interest loans and the increasing demand from investors for more 
such loans encouraged more risk taking on the part of lenders as more borrowers, including many who 
would otherwise not qualify were approved for loans, often with little documentation.  
As borrower delinquency rates, initially on subprime loans, began to noticeably rise during 2006 into 
2007, it was initially believed that the crisis could be contained within the subprime sector but as 
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delinquencies trended upward even among seemingly solid borrowers with fixed interest loans, it became 
evident that it could not. With the deteriorating economy shedding jobs at accelerated pace, the foreclosure 
rate increased rapidly, pointing to the mounting social and economic costs to come.  As the housing market 
collapse unfolded and a full blown financial crisis now threatened the entire economy, investors sought to 
minimize their losses and many borrowers sought to hold on to their homes. The tension between these 
competing interests intensified as foreclosure prevention measures were implemented in a number of 
states. New York, for instance, mandated pre-foreclosure notices to delinquent borrowers and set up 
housing counseling and other services to assist borrowers at risk of losing their homes. It became clear that 
a torrent of foreclosed properties hurts not just families, but the viability of entire communities, local property 
tax revenue, and the entire economy. From the investors’ perspective, the overriding interest in protecting 
the value of their assets and cutting their losses in the face of declining home values left little motivation to 
modify loans.   
The policy response - the Home Affordable Modification Program - seemed to recognize these economic 
tensions. However, in seeking to align the interests of borrowers and lenders/servicers and the investors 
they represent, the program fell far short. A higher rate of successful modifications would have been likely 
if certain program features had not limited the scope of both lender and borrower participation by 
establishing unrealistic barriers. The requirement that any applicant must already be delinquent on 
payments by 60 days or more essentially meant that many borrowers in high-cost mortgages had to choose 
between a greater likelihood of default sometime in the future or deliberately not making mortgage 
payments and gambling that they could qualify for a modification. Second, had there been no requirement 
that second lien modifications could only be considered if a first lien modification had first been attained, 
many more borrowers could have qualified. On the lender/servicer side, the requirement that borrowers be 
considered for a modification should have applied to all lenders, not just those receiving TARP funds. 
Further, had non-GSE lenders, many of whom were originators of subprime loans, been included in that 
requirement from the inception of HAMP, a larger pool of loans would have qualified for modification. All of 
these constraints resulted in far fewer permanent modifications than otherwise would have been possible. 
A 38.3 percent success rate among more than 2.5 million applicants who qualified and a 15.5 percent rate 
relative to 6.2 million foreclosures completed over this period is far less than optimal. 
Beyond these shortcomings, what might have produced a more effective policy outcome? From the 
perspective of servicers and the investors holding mortgages, is there a rate of foreclosure where the harm 
resulting from foreclosures is roughly equivalent to the cost of averting them?  Given that the economic 
costs of foreclosure extend well beyond the impact on the individual borrower and the individual 
servicer/investor, how could foreclosure rates have been reduced (and modification rates increased) to the 
point where the social and economic costs associated with foreclosures were in closer alignment with 
servicer/investor costs of preventing them? The following discussion proposes measures that could be a 
step in the direction of narrowing that gap.  
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First, suppose HAMP guidelines had mandated that all lenders/servicers participate in the program, 
considering the cost savings from modification vs. foreclosure based on a cost benefit approach - evaluating 
the actual costs of each decision. Lender/servicer motivations for foreclosing rather than modifying would 
be driven by an estimate of the actual costs of carrying out each action. So how can the costs be placed in 
context? An estimated 11.3 million – 24 percent – of homes with a mortgage were in negative equity in Q3 
2009 in the depths of the Great Recession, while the average dollar amount of negative equity at the time 
was $70,000 (CoreLogic Q3 2009). The higher the negative equity share, the greater was the probability of 
receiving a pre-foreclosure notice (CoreLogic Q3 2009) and thus, the greater the probability of foreclosure. 
It is quite likely, given the 6.2 million foreclosures between 2009 and 2016, that many of these properties 
ended in foreclosure.  
1) Assume that the original mortgage = M₀  and the modified mortgage with principal balance = M₁ . 
The costs (C) of modification equal total principal balance reduced of the negative equity amount (N).  
C = M₀ -N = M₁. 
Assume that M₀  = $300, 000 and negative equity = $70,000; then M₁  ≥ $230,000, but ≤ $299,999.  
If it is assumed that the average household mortgage was $300,000 in 2009 with average negative 
equity of $70,000 for the 24 percent of homes with a mortgage this constitutes a loss for the homeowner 
and the lender, either of whom could be on the losing end as a result. The borrower who can afford to, will 
continue making the mortgage payments. However, in the case of borrowers who put little money down 
and purchased a house that their incomes could not support – the question is how much of a mortgage 
they can afford to pay. If that number lies somewhere between $230,000 and $299,999, the lender (or 
investor holding the mortgage), should have an incentive to negotiate a principal balance reduction. A new 
mortgage of $230,000 would mean that both borrower and lender break even since the home is now worth 
$230,000.  
2) Now suppose the borrower can afford a modified mortgage with a principal balance reduction greater 
than $230,000. The borrower is assuming some of the negative equity. Here N assumes a value of $50,000. 
In this case, if a principal balance reduction to $250,000 is negotiated between borrower and lender, the 
lender attains an asset whose value is $230,000 and acquires $20,000, bypassing the expense of a 
potentially costly foreclosure process. Assuming half of the 11.3 million mortgage holders in negative equity 
were among those who could afford to pay this new principal balance, 5.65 million foreclosures would be 
avoided, borrowers would not lose the money already invested in their homes, and investors would retain 
their assets.  
3) Suppose another 3 million borrowers could not afford a mortgage of $250,000, but could manage a 
loan payment between $200,000 and $230,000, then the costs and benefits of foreclosure – such as the 
legal costs of carrying out foreclosure actions against borrowers, continued erosion of home values, the 
costs of preparing documentation, etc. must be weighed, since any renegotiated mortgage less than the 
property’s value would impose a cost on the lender. Assuming these foreclosure costs average $30,000, 
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the lender could agree to reduce the principal balance to $215,000 and potentially save $15,000 in 
foreclosure costs. Here, the costs of foreclosure avoidance (F) are still positive and: 
M₁  = M₀  - N - (30,000 – 15,000) = $215,000. 
The balance could be further reduced to as low as $200,000 for some borrowers and the lender would 
break even. Overall, such a scenario would potentially avoid another 3 million foreclosures and investors 
would again retain their assets. 
M₁  = M₀  - N – (30,000 – 0) = $200,000. 
What about the cost to investors? While ultimately, the costs of modification are borne by the investor 
while benefiting the homeowner, additional requirements stipulating that lender and investor share in the 
gain from a modified mortgage would ensure the benefits are distributed to both parties. In the case where 
the lender/servicer gains $20,000 from a modified loan of $250,000, half of that acquisition would go to the 
investor. In the case of the $215,000 loan, the same requirement would apply. Assuming some 
modifications result in a principal balance reduction to $200,000, the investor writes off the loss of $30,000 
in equity at the time the mortgage is modified, but still retains the asset. At the same time, the larger 
economy benefits from having fewer foreclosed houses on the market to further bring down property values, 
drain tax revenues and further weaken economic recovery.   
However, what about borrowers who are still unable to afford a $200,000 modified mortgage? Employing 
the same example, in such cases where foreclosure is more likely, the lender would acquire the property 
and find a new buyer. However, several questions arise. What kind of loan was made to the borrower (i.e., 
high interest, interest only, negative amortizing, etc.)? Was little or no documentation required? If the loan 
was high risk, the lender should be held accountable for contributing to the excessive systemic risk that led 
to widespread default rates and the plummeting home values, job losses and financial crisis that nearly led 
to economic collapse.  
Originators of high-risk loans, many of which were subprime, would be required to bear some of the 
costs of their decisions. A number of factors might be weighed in determining that cost. In the case of 
borrowers who put money down, how much did they pay? How much principal had already been paid? 
Were any improvements made to the home? In every instance, what is the cost to the homeowner of 
packing up and moving out? Compensation to displaced homeowners should at the very least be based on 
such costs borne by the homeowner. Further, the lender would be required to contribute a portion of those 
costs to state and/or federal level foreclosure prevention programs. If it is assumed that homeowner costs 
are $10,000, then the lender pays $8,000 to the borrower to offset the costs of finding new housing and 
contributes $2,000 to the state or federal program. Such measures send a clear message: that contributing 
to systemic risk requires sharing responsibility and payment of some kind of penalty.  
Finally, there were clearly many otherwise creditworthy borrowers who became delinquent and went 
into default following job loss. As the unemployment rate quickly rose during the Great Recession, the odds 
that these homeowners would be able to resume payments after just a few months and/or upon finding a 
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new job were slim. Average unemployment duration was more than 24 weeks in 2009, and averaged 37 
weeks over 2010-2012 when the effects of the recession were still being felt (Statista, 2017), making default 
far more likely.  
HAMP included an unemployment program in which homeowners could be approved either for a 
forbearance plan with some payment required or with no payment required for 12 months, allowing 
homeowners to seek new employment without losing their homes. However, of the 46,485 applicants who 
were approved for and started the plans, 24 percent remained current on payments after 12 months (MHA 
Quarterly Report, Q4 2016). Clearly, this has some positive economic impact. A 2016 study found that …” 
foreclosure delay during the recession improved the quality of new employment matches, raised national 
income by about 0.3 percent and increased homeownership by about 800,000 units (Herkenhoff and 
Ohanian, 2016).             
However, might the success rate have been higher if, in addition to forbearance, unemployed borrowers 
had been evaluated for a mortgage modification with a principal balance reduction, applying the same 
guidelines as those detailed above? In this case, once borrowers resume making the resulting lower 
payments, the end result may have resulted in a lower re-default rate. Given that for another 32 percent of 
homeowners, the final outcome was bankruptcy, action pending or a charge off, while another 6 percent 
re-entered the foreclosure process or a deed-in-lieu, principal balance reductions could have produced a 
stronger forbearance success rate.         
 
5. CONCLUSIONS   
Clearly the challenges borrowers faced in renegotiating their home mortgages illustrates the risks they 
were considered to pose in the context of depressed home prices and worsening economic conditions.  
The application of a model based on the framework posed here would bring foreclosure prevention into 
closer alignment with the goal of protecting investors. This actually requires lenders/servicers to reach a 
modification agreement with applicants where possible. The result, where borrowers, lenders/servicers and 
investors benefit from the outcome not only reduces the social disruptions caused by massive foreclosures, 
but helps to minimize the larger economic costs, potentially easing the impact of a steep downturn, 
stabilizing affected communities, and stemming the blight of foreclosed properties in neighborhoods already 
experiencing eroding home values. At the same time, the property tax base in those communities is 
stabilized at a time when revenue needs are greatest.    
Preventing even a significant percentage of the 6.2 million foreclosures that occurred between 2009 and 
2016 could have resulted in significantly less income and wealth loss in the economy, while avoiding the 
costs of foreclosure incurred both by the homeowner and financial institutions, as well as the various 
government entities involved in legal processing of foreclosure actions.   
The data and the analysis reviewed on HAMP’s outcomes in successful permanent modification of 
distressed home loans suggest that policy design is critical. National policy design must be more robust in 
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addressing the larger picture, in this case the economy-wide costs of widespread foreclosure both during 
and in the immediate aftermath of a steep downturn such as the Great Recession. This requires 
lender/servicer participation and the establishment of a set of guidelines for their participation. Those posed 
here offer a framework for thinking about such participation. At the very least, this should oblige 
lenders/servicers to evaluate not only the costs but the immediate and long-term benefits of loan 
modification. The perspective offered here may offer a starting point for more formal analyses that evaluate 
sample data on foreclosure outcomes over the course of HAMP’s modification program.  
 
ENDNOTES 
1. Hope for Homeowners (H4H), the initial program introduced in late 2008 in the final months of the 
Bush Administration, enabled underwater borrowers to refinance into an FHA guaranteed 
mortgage. H4H relied upon the voluntary participation of lenders and servicers. Prior to 2008, when 
the first signs of soaring foreclosure rates began to appear principally in the subprime market, 
efforts which encouraged lenders and servicers to work with subprime borrowers to modify their 
high variable interest rate loans into fixed rate loans, relied upon voluntary participation in such 
efforts by lenders and loan servicers. 
2. The Subprime Foreclosure Prevention Working Group consisted of several state attorneys general 
and state bank supervisors.  
3. Following changes made to the Treasury Department’s guidelines under the terms of the HAMP 
Principal Reduction Alternative, servicers of non-GSE loans were required to evaluate borrowers 
for a principal reduction (although they are not required to provide such a modification) under the 
terms of the national mortgage settlement (U.S. Treasury, Dec. 2012) with the nation’s five largest 
servicers. As a result, many servicers began to increase the use of non-PRA principal reductions 
after 2012.   
4. Based on the details of U.S. Treasury HAMP reports, one of the principal reasons has had much 
to do with policy guidelines and limitations under HAMP that were still in effect through year-end 
2012. Those guidelines stated that while both GSE and non-GSE loans (i.e. many subprime loans) 
were eligible to participate in a HAMP modification, GSE policy (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) 
stipulated that servicers can only offer a principal balance reduction – a PRA (or Principal Reduction 
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